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Faith and Credit Clause makes enforce-
able the judgment of one state in all 
others. Once a court of competent juris-
diction in one state has determined that a 
defendant is the debtor of a plaintiff, it 
will allow an action on the debt in other 
states where the defendant has property, 
even if the latter wouldn't originally have 
had jurisdiction to determine the debt. 
A number of reasons why contacts with 
a state can support a finding of jurisdic-
tion are given by the Court. A defendant's 
claim to property located in a state would 
normally indicate an expected benefit 
from the state's protection of that prop-
erty. A state has an interest in assuring the 
marketability of property within its bor-
ders as well as in providing a procedure 
for peaceful resolution of disputes about 
posseSSion of the property. Also, there is 
the likelihood that important records and 
witnesses will be found in the state where 
the property is located. The Court notes, 
however, that while these and other fac-
tors may affect a decision as to jurisdic-
tion, none is necessarily decisive. 
It's Alright 
Ma (Bell) 
by Andrew S. Katz 
With a proper order from a United 
States District Court, federal law enforce-
ment officials may now compel your local 
telephone company to provide facilities 
and technical assistance in support of 
electronic surveilance operations author-
ized by warrant. In the decision of United 
States v. New York Telephone Company, 
46 U.S.L.W. 4033 (Dec. 6, 1977), the 
~ THE FORUM 
United States Supreme Court upheld an 
order of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York authoriz-
ing agents of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation to install pen registers (a 
device that records the numbers dialed on 
a telephone) and directing the New York 
Telephone Company to provide the FBI 
with the information and facilities neces-
sary to employ the pen registers covertly 
during the investigation of an illegal gam-
bling operation. 
The District Court issued the order on 
the basis of an FBI affidavit stating that 
there was probable cause to believe that 
two telephones in Manhattan were being 
used in furtherance of illegal gambling ac-
tivity. The Company refused fully to com-
ply with the court order, locating the lines 
that were of interest but refusing to lease 
to the FBI unused lines needed to operate 
their equipment without notice. Although 
the FBI was authorized to compensate the 
Company for its assistance, the agents 
were advised to string their own cables to 
the suspects' apartment, a task impossible 
to accomplish without alerting the 
suspects. The Company moved in the Dis-
trict Court to vacate that part of the order 
directing it to furnish facilities and techni-
cal assistance to the FBI on the ground 
that the order could only be issued in con-
nection with a wiretap order meeting the 
requirements of Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. It 
denyed that the District Court possessed 
authority to give the order under either 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 or the All Writs 
Act, 28 U.s.c. § 1651(a). The District 
Court held that pen registers are not 
governed by Title III because they do not 
intercept oral communication, they only 
record phone numbers. It claimed jurisdic-
tion to issue the order upon a showing of 
probable cause relying upon the authority 
of the All Writs Act and its "inherent 
powers" to direct the Company to assist 
the FBI. 
In Application of the United States of 
America in the Matter of an Order 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register or 
Similar Mechanical Device, 538 F.2d 956 
(2d. Cir. 1976), the Court of Appeals 
agreed with the District Court on the 
scope of Title III and the power to author-
ize pen register surveilance under Fed. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 41. However, the ma-
jority also held that "in the absence of 
specific and properly limited Congres-
sional action, it was an abuse of discretion 
for the District Court to order the 
Telephone Company to furnish technical 
assistance." 538 F. 2d at 961. The Court 
of Appeals warned that "such an order 
could establish a most undersirable, if not 
dangerous and unwise, precedent for the 
authority of the federal courts to impress 
unwilling aid on private third parties" and 
that "there is no assurance that the court 
will always be able to protect (third par-
ties) from excessive or overzealous 
Government activity or compUlsion." 538 
F. 2d at 962-963. The District Court's 
order against the Company was invali-
dated and a petition for certiorari was 
granted by the Supreme Court. 
Justice White's majority opinion 
(joined in by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices BIackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist) reviews the language and legislative 
history of Title III and concludes that pen 
registers are not within the scope of its re-
quirements. Title III is concerned with the 
interception of wire or oral communica-
tion, "intercept meaning 'the aural aquisi-
tion of the contents of any wire or oral 
communication through the use of any 
electronic, mechanical, or other device.' 
18 U.s.c. § 2510(4). Pen registers do not 
acquire the 'contents' of communica-
tions .... " 46 U.S.L.W. at 4035. 
Therefore, reasons the majority, the Dis-
trict Court had authority to direct the 
Company to provide assistance to the FBI 
although the pen register order was not in 
conformity with Title III. 
By holding that the District Court had 
power to authorize the installation of the 
pen registers, the majority expands the 
meaning of search and seizure under Fed. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 41 to include a "search" 
to discover the use a telephone is being 
put to when there is a suspicion of its in-
volvement in a criminal venture. Rule 41 
authorizes warrants for seizures of prop-
erty or contraband and "property" is 
defined to include documents, books, 
papers and any other tangible objects. 
The opinion states that "it does not 
restrict or purport to exhaustively 
enumerate all the items which may be 
seized pursuant to Rule 41." 46 U.S.L.W. 
at 4036. The majority's belief that Rule 
41 encompasses authorization for seizures 
of such intangibles as dial impulses made 
by a telephone is based in part on the 
view of Congress, as shown by debate 
over Title III, that pen registers pose a 
lesser threat to privacy than interception 
of oral communications. Further support 
for the District Court's authority was 
found in Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 57(b) 
which provides "If no procedure is spec-
cifically prescribed by rule, the court may 
proceed in any lawful manner not inc on-
sistant with these rules or with any ap-
plicable statute." 
The majority opinion rejected the 
Court of Appeals' position that the order 
compelling the Company to provide as-
sistance constituted an abuse of discre-
tion, concluding "that the order issued 
here against respondent was clearly 
authorized by the All Writs Act and was 
consistent with the intent of Congress." 
46 U.S.L.W. at 4037. The All Writs Act 
provides: 
"The Supreme Court and all courts es-
tablished by Act of Congress may issue 
all Writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and prinCiples 
of law." 28 U.S.c. §1651(a). 
The District Court was found to have the 
power under the All Writs Act to issue any 
commands needed to prevent frustration 
of orders it had previously issued. 
Furthermore, the majority extends the 
power to third persons, who although 
uninvolved in the original controversy, 
are capable of frustrating the implementa-
tion of a court order. Examining the facts 
of the case the majority concludes, " ... 
We do not think that the Company was a 
third party so far removed from the un-
derlying controversy that its assistance 
could not be permissibly compelled." 46 
U.S.L.W. at 4037. Characterizing the 
Telephone Company as "a highly regul-
ated public utility with a duty to serve the 
public," the majority found that the Com-
pany's duty extended to providing techni-
cal assistance when there was probable 
cause to believe the Company's facilities 
were being used to aid a criminal venture. 
Finally, the majority reviewed a 1970 
amendment to Title lll, 18 U.S.C. 
2518(4), that requires a communication 
common carrier to furnish any assistance 
necessary to carry-out an electronic inter-
ception. The majority reasoned that if 
Congresss has made provIsion for com-
pelling the assistance of phone companies 
for the conduct of electronic interception 
of oral communication, "it would be 
remarkable if Congress thought it beyond 
the power of the federal courts to exer-
cise, where required a discretionary 
authority to order telephone companies to 
assist in the installation and operation of 
pen registers, which accomplish a far 
lesser invasion of privacy." 46 U.S.L.W. 
at 4038. 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens (joined 
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and in part 
by Justice Stewart) admonished the ma-
jority for ignoring the principal of limited 
federal jurisdiction. This principal, he 
states is "never ... more important than 
when a federal court purports to authorize 
and implement the secret invasion of an 
individual's privacy." 46 U.S.L.W. at 
4038. The dissent emphasized that Con-
gress has neither given the district court a 
direct mandate to issue pen register inter-
cept orders nor has it di rected the courts 
to require private parties to provide as-
sistance in execution of its orders. With-
out a clear authorization from Congress, 
the dissent notes, -the federal courts 
should not presume the existence of juris-
diction to act; which is precisely what the 
majority has done in reaching its decision. 
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